T.J. Newton
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Intellectual Property .
Copyright Law & Social Change
T.J. Newton


The anti-sharing movement is about more than just copyright law, although recent efforts to frighten and punish people who download music and films have drawn the most attention in the campaign to prevent people from sharing anything from music to food. There has been a barrage of legislation proposed that unfairly favors the music and film industry, and some of it, like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, has even passed. Unfortunately, most of the legislation proposed advocates the use of social capitalism to suppress market change, and reflects errors in economic theory, as well as underlying flaws in social and political theory.

Perhaps the most blatant abuse of the right to share has been the efforts of the RIAA and MPAA, the music and film industry associations that have sued file sharers based on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, or "DMCA." The terrible lawsuits are being defended by a public relations campaign that accuses file sharers of stealing. While it is hoped that such a campaign will work to subdue the growing momentum against the DMCA, it is also hoped that people will come to think of sharing as stealing, and not just in terms of computer files. But computer files are at the forefront of the anti-sharing movement, even though it is not really accurate to make the argument that file sharing is the same as stealing.

Stealing is difficult to define beyond very simple terms, and even then, there are complicated philosophical arguments about stealing (1). But comparing file sharing to stealing something from a store, or from someone's home, doesn't work at all. For example, if you buy a new TV, and I break into your house and steal it, then you no longer possess a TV because I now have it. File sharing is more like you inviting me into your house and allowing me to use some sort of gadget to "make a copy" of your TV at no cost to either of us. You still have your TV, and now I have one, too. Of course, it isn't possible as far as I know to "copy a TV," at least without a factory, but it is possible to copy audio, video, and computer files. The problem creates a number of difficulties in modern life. When cable TV first came out, they charged you a monthly fee per connected television in your home, and it was "stealing" to use a splitter and hook up 2 TV's. Now it is allowed, and it is "not stealing." Yet, they call it "stealing" if you and your neighbor try to hook your homes together and each pay half the price for cable TV. I think most people just let the cable (and satellite) industry slide on that one. But nearly everyone agrees that splicing into a wire under the street is a crime. There are even stranger examples in the restaurant industry. Suppose Hilary Rosen of the RIAA and I decide to go to the steakhouse around the corner from my apartment. Hilary only wants a beer, and I want a steak. After ordering, I decide I can't finish my steak, and Hilary suddenly feels hungry after seeing and smelling it. So I share my steak. The restaurant accuses us of "stealing" and charges me double the price of the steak. But really, there is no way it is stealing. This really makes the point that there appears to be a movement against sharing. Time and again, laws and corporate policies are being used to prevent people from sharing with one another by calling it stealing.

Of course, the so-called "intellectual property sector," which includes the music industry, "Hollywood," and the computer software industry, along with a host of other related businesses, has gone much further than suing file sharers. Some of their latest efforts are also related to the DMCA, and more recently, related to the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act (S. 2560 (3)). Also known as the "Induce" Act, the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act attempts to blame sharing on technology, under the justification that technology makers are infringing on copyright protection. However, since there is nothing wrong with sharing, technology maker's shouldn't be blamed for the anti-sharing movement's use of using social capitalism to try and steal people's ability to share with one another. Sharing has been around much longer than so-called "enabling" technology. And it is ridiculous to attempt to use copyright law to punish someone who has never shared, or even possessed, the copyrighted work.

Ridiculous "acts" are a staple of the anti-sharing movement. For example, they are trying to roll back the VCR by putting chips in newer devices to prevent recording, and limiting the number of playbacks allowed for downloaded movies. They are also offering music downloads (in a format other than MP3) that can only be played on a few devices, or a few times, along with countless other little tricks. Some cable companies are even offering "on-demand" services that allow customers to download shows and watch them at any time, sometimes for "free," and the companies argue that there is no need to record the shows since they will always be available for "free" download. But the shows aren't really a "free" download. You have to be a subscriber. I kind of like taping something and being able to watch it with my peers whenever I want, even if I decide to cancel all or part of my cable subscription.

It can sometimes seem like the entire intellectual property sector feels threatened by the idea of sharing. Take the Linux operating system, a competitor with Microsoft Windows. Linux is free, and anyone is allowed to work on the computer code that makes it work. That idea seems to annoy companies that charge a fortune for their operating systems, and everything from bogus lawsuits to really strange restrictions have been levied against companies and individuals that work with Linux. For example, there is a movement to prevent DVD's from being played on a Linux system, I guess because someone would rather monopolize exclusive rights. What if you could only watch VHS videos on a Sony? If anyone is stealing, it is the people attempting to steal the ability to watch DVD's from Linux users.

The ability to watch DVD's is not the only thing being stolen from the public by the anti-sharing movement. How would you like to lose your privacy online, or have the music and film industry permanently destroy your computer? A bill called H.R. 5211 appears to allow hackers that work for the music and film industry to crash the computers of file sharers. As long as music and film industry hackers provide the Attorney General (but not the public) with notice of their hacking tools, they seem to be "authorized" to "impair" the computer system of someone sharing files over a peer-to-peer network in any way they want, so that the shared files cannot be played (provided no more than $50.00 damage is done - that's $50.00 per copyrighted file). For example, a sound card could have its drivers disabled by a music or film industry hacker, assuming it does not cost the owner of the computer more than $50.00 (or more if there are multiple files) in labor or other costs to re-install or re-enable the driver. This is a very serious problem. The hacker is apparently given "authorization" to damage files and data that are unrelated to the copyrighted work.

Instead of using music and film industry hackers, H.R. 4077, the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act, enlists the help of government hackers called "CHIPs" to spy on file sharers, threatening the privacy and security of all consumers and businesses who use the Internet. To make matters worse, these hacker-agents want to throw file sharers in jail. But the rationalization for the bill, provided in the bill itself as well as in the report (4), reveals the weaknesses in the arguments made by the intellectual property sector against file sharing. While some of their arguments are deceptive, or conflicted at best, a few of the arguments made in H.R. 4077 actually aid the case of file sharers.

Sec. 9 (a)(2) The vast majority of software products, including peer-to-peer technology, do not pose an inherent risk. Responsible persons making software products should be encouraged and commended for the due diligence and reasonable care they take including by providing instructions, relevant information in the documentation, disseminating patches, updates, and other appropriate modifications to the software. [...] (5) The full potential of peer-to-peer technology to benefit consumers has yet to be realized... [...] (b)(1) It is the sense of the Congress that ...responsible software developers should be commended, recognized, and encouraged for their efforts to protect consumers... (PDEA).

This vindicates file sharers and technology makers who are fighting S. 2560 (3), the "Induce" Act, which attempted to blame sharing on technology, under the justification that technology makers are infringing on copyright protection. It isn't the software maker's fault that many file sharers have shared music or films, particularly when there is nothing wrong with sharing music or films. File sharing is not stealing, and social capitalism cannot be used to suppress the constitutionally valid views of file sharers seeking to defend themselves against the anti-sharing movement.

However, H.R. 4077 contradicts itself as well as other legislation. Since there is nothing wrong with file sharing, the bill does not attempt to engage in a debate with file sharers. Instead, the bill relies on scare tactics to invent a new reason to throw innocent people in jail. Persecuting people who state the obvious is a classic response from governments. File sharers are not proposing that the Earth orbits the Sun, only that there is nothing wrong with file sharing.

Some of the reasoning behind this terrible bill attempts to frighten the public into believing that file sharing is dangerous. Other parts make no sense at all.

Sec. 2 (4) Many computer users simply believe that they will not be caught or prosecuted for their conduct.

(5) The security and privacy threats posed by certain peer-to-peer networks extend beyond users inadvertently enabling a hacker to access files. Millions of copies of one of the most popular peer-to-peer networks contain software that could allow an independent company to take over portions of users' computers and Internet connections and has the capacity to keep track of users' online habits. [...]

Sec. 9 (b)(2) currently the level of ongoing and persistent illegal and dangerous activity on publicly accessible peer-to-peer file sharing services is harmful to consumers, minors, and the economy... [...]

Sec. 2 (6) In light of these considerations, Federal law enforcement agencies should actively pursue criminals who steal the copyrighted works of others, and prevent such activity through enforcement and awareness. The public should be educated about the security and privacy risks associated with being connected to certain peer-to-peer networks. [...]

Sec. 9 (b)(3) therefore, the Congress and the executive branch should consider all appropriate measures to protect consumers and children, and prevent such illegal activity (PDEA).

To begin with, does part of the "education" one is to receive from the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act have to do with the fear of getting caught? How do beliefs about being caught have anything to do with the arguments currently being made by file sharers? File sharers aren't criminals attempting to evade capture. They don't believe they're doing anything wrong because there is nothing wrong with file sharing.

The statements about "security and privacy (PDEA Sec. 2)" contradict and confuse the honest statement contained in the same legislation that most peer-to-peer software is safe (PDEA Sec. 9). In fact, enlisting government hacker-agents to spy on Internet users actually threatens privacy and security on the Internet because it creates an online climate that is likely to harm consumers and businesses who use the Internet.

The talk about harming minors in H.R. 4077 is obviously a scare tactic. If it weren't, the argument wouldn't conclude by stating that "Federal law enforcement agencies should actively pursue criminals who steal the copyrighted works of others (PDEA Sec. 2)." If safety were the real purpose of this bill, it would increase awareness in a responsible and constitutionally valid way instead of pursuing file sharers. And what about the fact that file sharing isn't stealing? You won't find that discussion anywhere in this bill, because the arguments were shaped by the political interests of the anti-sharing movement.

H.R. 4077 also has an economic justification similar to H.R. 5057. In that bill, from June 27th, 2002, the errors in economic, social, and political theory are apparent. The bill openly states that its purpose is to protect the profits of the intellectual property sector because it has a large stake in the economy. Some may wonder why there is only an economic motive behind the bill. For example, if the music and film industry were not profitable, would it be protected? Actually, the reason behind the economic basis of the bill is simple, even though the flaws in the bill reflect flaws in current economic, social, and political theory.

Copyright Law

Copyright law extends rights of republication to authors because it would have been difficult for the author to make a profit without those rights at the time the law was created (OCAL 661). It is not intended to protect the author for any other reason, such as the author's "natural right" to his or her own work (OCAL 661).

Today, it has become technologically possible to offer media and multimedia publications to consumers through networked file sharing. The copyright holder can still make a profit under such a system, sufficient to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts…" as stated in the Constitution (OCAL 661). The copyright holder should always be able to profit as much as possible in the market, but no one should be allowed (OCAL 661) to control the market through social mechanisms in order to control the amount of profit one makes. The copyright holder should still have exclusive rights to their work (OCAL 661), because the work should only be changed in ways that respect the copyright holder's claim to the work. But just because the copyright holder has exclusive rights to distribution (OCAL 661), this does not mean they should be able to control a distribution system that meets the constitutional requirements of copyright law, such as networked file sharing.

S. 2560 (3), the "Induce" Act, gives into the anti-sharing movement by surrendering a distribution system that meets the constitutional requirements of copyright law, and the problems with trying to control sharing are obvious when one attempts to interpret the bill. Defining exactly what parts of the distribution system infringe on copyright holders now seems to be the focus of most of the attention on the bill. How does one interpret a bill based on an idea that could permit lawsuits against anyone from television manufacturers to book publishers? Because interpretations of any anti-sharing legislation are not likely to begin with the admission that there is nothing wrong with sharing, interpretations and modifications to the bill and what it stands for are likely to be influenced and motivated by the political demands of the anti-sharing movement.

The arguments of the "Induce" Act are defeated by H.R. 4077, the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act, which argues that distribution systems such as networked file sharing are safe and have great potential, and that technology makers should be commended for peer-to-peer software. Unfortunately, H.R. 4077 also proposes that file sharers be thrown in jail by government hacker-agents that spy on file sharers.

Another bill, H.R. 5057, even goes so far as to justify copy protection features using copyright law, although the economic justification for doing so is ridiculous (OCAL 661). Such features are not part of the copyrightable work. For example, if a book is printed on paper that bursts into flames when passed to someone else or photocopied, one could not argue that this is part of the original work, because the book only bursts into flames under certain conditions, and flaming pages have nothing to do with the story in the book. It doesn't matter if, instead of bursting into flames, the book produces an invisible message, or sprouts legs and walks over to the phone and calls the author when you aren't looking.

As this essay will show, file sharing is constitutionally defendable, and although laws have been enacted based on social capitalism to wrongfully empower copyright holders, file sharing has not been properly debated or considered in terms of constitutionality. H.R. 5211 attempts to keep this debate from ever happening. If changes in other laws were handled by allowing citizens to enforce the status quo however they wanted - with the blessing of the Attorney General - we would still be living with atrocities like child labor and segregation. While file sharing cannot be compared to either of those atrocities, this bill attempts to suppress the constitutionally valid argument of file sharers through fear and overt interference in the private lives of individuals. By contrast, the serious crime the music and film industry hackers are committing has no constitutional basis. It is the equivalent of a television producer breaking into your house and smashing your VCR, provided it cost less than $50.00 to repair or replace, and provided you are showing a tape to a group of "peers." Why should anyone be given permission to do this? What is the constitutional justification?

As it stands, it represents an unreasonable illegal search of files not shared on peer-to-peer networks (used for playback, for example). There is nothing to prevent the hacker from searching computer files in order to disable whatever it is that is being disabled. The law does not state that file sharers cannot defend themselves, but it would take great skill and resources to do so, and that is something the music and film industry has that most file sharers do not. It turns Americans against one another: rich against poor, ideology against ideology. It opens the door to new and legal ways to conduct corporate and government espionage, especially when one works from home or on a laptop or other device. It places all music and films at risk in the event of inter-industry lawsuits or disputes, or disagreements between artists. To make matters worse, this bill turns law enforcement - of an ill-conceived law - over to private citizens. It allows the forces that file sharers are trying to change to interfere with the private, everyday lives of the file sharers, and the sense of personal violation in such a relationship can only provoke the kind of action that the Constitution seeks to avoid. Hilary Rosen of the RIAA has said that it is not in the record industry's "interest" to go into anyone's hard drive, but the legislation simply doesn't read that way, forcing consumers to trust an industry that seems to have declared an "Internet arms race," even if their activities consist mainly of sabotaging peer-to-peer networks with "dummy songs" (2) and suing file sharers. This legislation, along with the lawsuits, demonstrates that the music and film industry cannot peacefully engage in a debate. Their case is weak, so they've decided to go and attack the music and film fan. H.R. 5211 is a bad idea, and sabotaging peer-to-peer networks is indeed likely to provoke an "Internet arms race," if suing file sharers has not already done so.

The Piracy Deterrence and Education Act, H.R. 4077, goes further than suing by attempting to throw file sharers in jail, and does more to provoke and anger Internet users by enlisting government hacker-agents to spy on Internet users they believe may be sharing files. Such a move would all but destroy privacy and security on the Internet, and would create a climate harmful to consumers and businesses.

Of course, they're doing all they can to harm people who use the Internet, and suing everyone in their way. Portions of the "Induce" Act may be intended to target makers of file sharing software, even though the software can be used for more than sharing music or films. It isn't the software maker's fault that many file sharers have shared music or films, particularly when there is nothing wrong with sharing music or films. File sharing is not stealing, and social capitalism cannot be used to suppress the constitutionally valid views of file sharers seeking to defend themselves against the anti-sharing movement.

The Free Market and Change

When natural market change occurs as it has in the media and multimedia distribution market, it is tempting to respond by suppressing the change. But it is erroneous to suppress a legal distribution system to protect wealthy interests. However, sometimes it can seem as though there should be programs for what may be negative social effects brought about by market change. For example, copyright law can be seen as a solution to change in certain markets, and copyright law has evolved over time according to various factors in different markets (OCAL 661).

As it currently stands, copyright law is interpreted in the relative absence of a program for dealing with the negative effects of changing markets. That is why it is holding back change. A program for dealing with the negative effects of changing markets could allow copyright law to evolve by freeing copyright law from being used to protect against any negative effects of market change. Copyright law would, of course, continue to protect against legitimate copyright violations (OCAL 661).

Instead of allowing the media and multimedia distribution market to change with available technology, wealthy interests have lobbied for the use of social capitalism to control the market. With social capitalism, the market is controlled to suit a political agenda. In this case, social capitalism is being used to place restrictions on the market that benefit the wealthy. But this is not the correct constitutional interpretation of copyright law, or of the economic theory behind it (OCAL 661).

Social capitalism can be used to limit individual freedom, and it is often justified by an economic theory in which freedom is conceived as the maximization of self-interest within given social conventions. But the concept of freedom must include the role of social, cognitive, and environmental events in individual lives, and economic theory does not account for these factors.

Economic Theory

The basic idea of economic theory is that individuals act to maximize their self-interest (Cahn 384; OCP 368, 416; Skinner 132-136). This is true for both merchants and customers (OCP 368, 416; Skinner 132-136). For example, when a merchant and a customer enter into an economic exchange, like the purchase of a loaf of bread, it is in the merchant's self-interest to profit by as much as the customer is willing to pay, and it is in the customer's self-interest to pay as little as the merchant is willing to take (OCP 416). In this way, it is thought, the merchant and customer benefit one another by maximizing their own self-interest (OCP 416).

Economists see demand purely in terms of self-interest, so that a product will be purchased if the cost and benefits appropriately maximize the self-interest of the purchaser (Ambler 15-19, 146-150; Lane 33). In other words, people need bread, and they will buy the best bread they can buy at the lowest price they can afford. In the neo-classical model, supply induces demand, and demand can't be "created" (Ambler 15-19, 146-150; Lane 33). Marketers, on the other hand, recognize that a particular brand of bread may be purchased according to cognitive desires and beliefs, and that the purchase decision is affected by social and environmental factors (Ambler 15-19, 146-150; Lane 33). As a result, marketers see demand as inducing supply to varying degrees (Ambler 15-19, 146-150; Lane 33). Demand for a particular brand of bread may be created, or increased, by associating the bread with the desires and beliefs of the consumer through advertisements in the social and physical environment, and by advertising the bread to make it appear as though it is an important part of the social and physical environment. Of course, this does not mean that the cost of the bread does not matter, or that the quality of the bread is not a factor (Ambler 15-19, 146-150; Lane 33). Maximizing self-interest cannot be ignored; it just is not the only factor. However, classical and neo-classical economic theory has been studied much longer than marketing theory, and neo-classical economic theory remains dominant in business today (Ambler 15-19, 146-150).

These flaws in economic theory continued into economic game theory. Game theory, which is based on the work of mathematician John Nash, uses a mathematical equation to represent a market strategy as a game. The game takes place in an "environment" which "typically includes a space consisting of admissible profiles of individual characteristics" (Farina et al. 307). This assumes that the environment itself (consisting of physical objects) is too complex and varied to completely model, but that the environment will cause a finite set of behavioral characteristics among individuals, which in a "given" environment, can be modeled probabilistically. So in a given environment, there may be a 50% chance a given person will be thirsty, and a 50% chance they won't be.

If we say that a person is thirsty, then they must compete in the market to satisfy their self-interest (here, thirst). There are two important "social norms" in game theory that follow. The first is that (assuming a market in which there is one glass of water and one customer) either the customer or the merchant will "win" (Farina et al. 303). And the second is that each will play for whatever benefits them most (i.e. self-interest) (Farina et al. 303). So, either the customer will get a "steal," or the merchant will "rip off" the customer, although there are varying shades of "stealing" and "ripping off" in a given "matrix." Of course, there are many other rules, including one that says making one player better off will make the other player worse off (Farina et al. 305).

In economic game theory, "rational behavior" (Farina et al. 310-311) assumes that players will attempt to acquire the benefits according to a "strategy" (Farina et al. 312-314) that can be modeled according to various "inputs" (Farina et al. 315). Of course, knowing the inputs in a particular game may increase the probability of a particular strategy, but economists insist that in the absence of such knowledge, they can still offer the best explanation using the simplest criteria.

Problems with Economic Theory

Because game theory is based on self-interested economic behavior, there are two serious problems. First, although behavior is more difficult to describe and less predictable in a model that includes social, cognitive, and environmental variables, it is possible to calculate probabilities for behavior according to a larger generalized model. Unfortunately, variables that don't fit into a game-theory matrix are simply treated as "irrational" or "random." Second, the effects of environments designed according to a limited model should be considered in terms of probability, and social, cognitive, and environmental variables should be accounted for when considering such effects.

For example, in a game that describes the purchase of a glass of water, it would not be "inefficient" to include in one's model variables such as mood, personality, the lighting in the room, the brand of the water and the characteristics associated with it, and whether or not there was a traffic jam outside of the water store.

It would also be a good idea to consider the effects, both on the individual and society, of playing only games in which the goal is to "rip off" one another to some degree. If the demand for water increases in such a way that many people go thirsty, will the merchant let the people go thirsty, or will the merchant take a small loss and build a new water factory? Does the merchant understand the social effects of denying people water? Did the merchant reach the decision to deny people water based on a limited economic model?

By including so many factors, the probability of a healthy society increases, but the probability of predicting a given environment decreases, because there are so many variables. But these factors play a large role in the market. For example, someone may decide to buy water because the tree on the bottle label is the same as the tree in their yard.

Including social, cognitive, and environmental factors in economic behavior also draws attention to some of the social abuses that have gone unnoticed by economic theory. For example, a merchant that does not wish to spend the money on clean water for everyone may tell some of the people that dirty water is sacred or curative, and make a higher profit selling dirty water than if they had provided clean water. Even though the merchant is using economic theory to maximize their profit, they are abusing the theory by covertly using social and cognitive factors in a kind of false advertisement.

But it isn't as if you can just send some thirsty people out to a dirty pond while others drink clean water. Maybe the people drinking dirty water will demand clean water, and maybe they won't. That is hard to predict, but it is impossible to even consider using an economic theory that doesn't even acknowledge the problem. It makes no sense to make decisions based on the current economic model, because individuals will constantly confront an environment that is hostile to social, cognitive, and environmental factors. A healthy society cares about its members, and eventually people will discover that their health, and freedom, is being put at risk by a society that only recognizes the maximization of profit.

Of course, for some problems, economic game theory is handy. Thirsty people will make predictable sacrifices if denied water (e.g. they may drink from the dirty pond), although there may be a few "random" or "irrational" people who decide not to drink from the dirty pond, perhaps because they believe the pond water is poisonous. The point is that although game theory is a handy way to analyze the problem, it can't be used to justify letting people go thirsty, or to trick people into drinking dirty water with false advertising that covertly appeals to social and cognitive factors. The use of game theory as a social and political model must come to an end.


To avoid sacrificing individuality to wealthy interests, such as forcing poor people to drink dirty water under certain conditions in the water market, a program for dealing with the negative social effects of changing markets is needed. Such a program is justifiable, because it is the only way to balance social and economic interests. One has to be able to consider what is best in at least more than economic terms, and feel at least as justified in acting on such considerations as in acting on economic considerations alone. This is fair competition. It is difficult to compete without clean water.

When there is a business model that offers the potential to balance social and economic interests while still allowing markets to evolve with available technology, it is a justifiable choice. Allowing networked file sharing of media and multimedia is justifiable, and does not jeopardize the idea of profit incentive behind copyright law. The current proposals for copyright reform continue the use of social capitalism to suppress market change, and reflect a lack of the kind of social programs needed to alleviate the negative effects of market change. The failure to include social, cognitive, and environmental factors in economic theory has allowed social capitalism to go unchecked in social and political life for too long, and the practice must be stopped.

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1. Consider the "famous" philosophical argument about the man whose wife has a fatal disease. She will die in 3 days unless the man can find a cure. There is only one doctor in the world that has a cure, and it costs a million dollars. The man is poor, and can't afford the cure. The doctor refuses to give the man any of the medicine, stating that it is his right to charge whatever he wants. The moral dilemma is about whether it is more wrong for the man to steal the cure, or more wrong to let his wife die when there is a cure available to save her.

2. http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/internet/09/27/media.piracy.reut/index.html

3. 10/14/2004. I could only find one version of S. 2560 from June 22, 2004 on the Senate website. PublicKnowledge.org had additional drafts on their website at http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/induce-act/.

4. Finally... I stumbled onto the reports...


OCAL: Hall, Kermit L., ed. (2002). The Oxford Companion to American law. New York: Oxford University Press.

OCP: Honderich, Ted. ed. (1995). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

PDEA: United States. (2004). House of Representatives. Report. Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004. 108th Congress, H.R. 4077.

Selected works cited

Ambler, Tim. (1996). Marketing from advertising to zen. London: Pitman.

Cahn, Steven M., ed. (2002). Classics of moral and political philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Farina, Francesco, Frank Hahn, and Stefano Vannucci, eds. (1996). Ethics, rationality, and economic behavior. New York: Clarendon Press.

Hall, Kermit L., ed. (2002). The Oxford Companion to American law. New York: Oxford University Press.

Honderich, Ted. ed. (1995). The Oxford Companion to philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lane, Jan-Erik. ed. (1987). Bureaucracy and public choice. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Skinner, Andrew S. (1996). A system of social science: papers relating to Adam Smith. New York: Oxford University Press.

United States (2002). House of Representatives. H.R. 5211. 107th Congress, H.R. 5211. Washington: http://thomas.loc.gov.

---. (2002). House of Representatives. Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2002.107th Congress, H.R. 5057. Washington: http://thomas.loc.gov.

---. (2004). Senate. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004. 108th Congress, S. 2560. Washington: http://thomas.loc.gov.

---. (2004). House of Representatives. Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004. 108th Congress, H.R. 4077. Washington: http://thomas.loc.gov

---. (2004). House of Representatives. Report. Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004. 108th Congress, H.R. 4077. Washington: http://thomas.loc.gov

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